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Abstract: Levinas does not speak quite often about the Temple, but in his 
Talmudic commentaries, he says quite impressive things about the Temple 
and its image. Commenting the Tractate Yoma 10a of Talmud, he says that 
«The Temple of Jerusalem in Jewish thought is a symbol, which signifies for 
the whole of humanity». This paper focuses on clarify this sentence and the 
universality of one Temple, which «is an exact replica of the heavenly Temple, 
the order of absolute holiness» according with his comment to Rabbi Hayyim 
Volozhiner. I research the symbolic value of the Temple in Jerusalem built 
as in ruins and try to connect this value with the rest of Levinas’ philosophy, 
especially with his theory of sacrifice as substitution.
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Resumen: Levinas no suele hablar del Templo, pero en sus comentarios 
talmúdicos, dice algunas cosas muy impresionantes acerca del templo y de su 
imagen. Así, al comentar el Tratado Yoma 10a del Talmud, dice que «El temp-
lo de Jerusalén, según el pensamiento judío, es un símbolo, que significa para 
la humanidad entera». Este artículo se centra en clarificar esta tesis de Levinas 
y en la universalidad de un sólo templo, que según su comentario al Rabbi 
Hayyin Volozhiner «es una réplica exacta del Templo celestial, el orden de la 
santidad absoluta». Investigo el valor simbólico del templo de Jerusalén, tanto 
construido como en ruinas, e intento conectar este valor con el resto de la filo-
sofía de Levinas, espcialmente con su teoría del sacrificio como substitución.
Key Words: Templo de Jerusalén; Mesianismo político; Historia; Re-
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1. The symbolic value of the Temple of Jerusalem: some dif-
ficulties
In Beyond the Verse. A set of Talmudic Readings and Lectures, the 
Jewish2 philosopher Emmanuel Levinas does not speak frequently neither 
about temples, nor the Temple in general. However, in the few passages 
where he speaks of it, he says quite impressive things. The first of them 
is that
«The Temple of Jerusalem in Jewish thought is a symbol which signifies for the whole of 
humanity; it is not simply a national institution».3
According to this thesis, the Temple of Jerusalem differentiates 
itself of other temples. Perhaps the most immediate example should be 
Mount Gerizim, the central spatial point of Samaritan religion. Most of 
its believers live around this mount, where they worship God and perform 
their rituals —sacrificing, celebrating the Passover, etc.—. Believing in 
the sanctity of Mount Gerizim is the same thing as being a Samaritan, and 
for that reason, Mount Gerizim is a national institution and not a symbol 
of mankind.
The Quran, on the contrary, makes of the Kaaba the temple for the 
whole of humanity. As It says in the verse 96 of the third Surah:
«Verily, the first House (of worship) appointed for mankind was that at Bakkah (Mak-
kah), full of blessing, and a guidance for mankind».4 
Mecca due to the religious significance of the Kaaba, is a complete-
ly and utterly holy place for Islam. But the symbolic value both of Mecca 
[2]  David Patterson characterizes Levinas as a Jewish thinker. As he holds «a philosopher’s 
thinking is Jewish, inasmuch as it is deeply informed by the Hebrew language, Jewish sacred 
texts, the teachings of Torah and Talmud, a concept of divine creation, and related notions». 
The Talmudic texts are not only a matter of interpretation, but a point of departure for 
Levinas’ philosophy. This tradition is a set of conscious assumptions on the base of Levinas’ 
thinking. This paper focuses mainly on the widespread repercussions of Jewish tradition of 
Levinas thinking about the Other. Patterson’s quote can be found in: Patterson, D., «What 
makes Emmanuel Levinas a Jewish Thinker» in Serpytyte, R., A Century with Levinas. On the 
Ruins of Totality, Vilnius University Publishing House, Vilnius, 2009, p. 17. As Levinas himself 
confesses in 1975 «philosophy is derived from religion. It is called into being by a religion 
adrift, and probably religion is always adrift». Levinas, E. «Damages Due to Fire», in Nine 
Talmudic Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz, Indiana University Press, Bloomingtonm 1990, 
p. 182.
[3]  Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1994, p. 63.
[4]  The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation and Commentary, 3:96. Translated by Yusuf Ali
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and Kaaba are different from the one of Jerusalem and its Temple. Ac-
cording to Levinas and Jewish tradition, the Temple of Jerusalem signifies 
for the whole of humanity, whereas Jerusalem is a holy city for Judaism, 
Islam, Christianity and even Mandaeism. The Kaaba, according to Islamic 
religion, was the first Temple addressed by God to mankind and blessed by 
Him. It is a sacred and blessed temple for all nations on Earth — ‹ālamīn—, 
because of Hagar and Ishmael who are said to be buried there. They two 
belong to Yahweh’s promise to Abraham, and as the Qur’an puts in the 
mouth of Abraham:
«O our Lord! I have made some of my offspring to dwell in a valley without cultivation 
by thy Sacred House; in order O our Lord that they may establish regular prayer: so fill 
the hearts of some among men with love towards them and feed them with Fruits: so 
that they may give thanks».5
Abraham, sending into exile Hagar and Ishmael (some of his offs-
pring) into the wilderness of Beer-sheba (the valley without cultivation in 
the Desert of Paran), sets up a sacred place for ishmaelites. An isolated 
place in the wilderness for regular prayer and praise, that is: a cloister 
forever, where the ishmaelites can spiritually uplift. However, Mecca does 
not signify for the whole of humanity, but for some of the descendants of 
the Promise to Abraham.
It seems to be, that temples are cultural institutions. Why, then, 
the Jewish thought, and Levinas with it, holds that the Temple in Jerusa-
lem can signify for the whole of humanity? Which arguments support it?
Firstly, we must warn a misunderstanding. To associate the Tem-
ple of Jerusalem with humanity appears to indicate a sacralization of hu-
manity. Comte thought in that way: one must serve humanity. The ethical 
demand of the religion of humanity says: Vivre pour autrui!6 One must 
live for others! One must be a servant of humanity, and not a slave of God. 
However Judaism is not a religion of humanity. For Levinas, Humanity 
cannot be associated with God, and Judaism is a religion of the revelation 
of God to Humanity, of Its Torah.
Nevertheless, in the Jewish philosophical area Jacques Derrida 
and Daniel Breslauer support the view of a «Judaism without Religion»,7 
an inclusive Judaism that embraces all form of the other that it had pre-
[5]  Ibid., 14:37.
[6]  Comte, A., Système de politique positive, ou, Traité de sociologie, instituant la religion de l’humanit, 
République Occidentale, Tome Deuxième, 1852, p. 371.
[7]  Cf.: Breslauer, D., Creating A Judaism Without Religion: A Postmodern Jewish Possibility, Univer-
sity Press of America, Lanham, 2001.
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viously excluded, a secularized Judaism in which, one can find «Yiddish 
interrupting Hebrew, Hasidism interrupting rabbinism, women interrupt-
ing the masculinism of Jewish culture, and gays interrupting Israeli het-
erosexism».8 However it is obvious that Levinas finds itself pretty far from 
the ideas both of the secular humanists, and of the liberal Jews. Levinas 
does not put in the center of human existence humanity, but the Other. 
Not the self, neither the same, but the other of the same. And this entails 
that Levinas rejects the idea of liberal Jews of reducing the Other to the 
same of humanity. In which sense, then, Levinas thought a temple of such 
great importance, like the one of Jerusalem, as symbolizing the whole of 
humanity?
2. The text: Levinas as a Talmudic reader and interpreter
The text about the symbolic value of the temple in Jerusalem is 
extracted from a chapter in which Levinas comments the Talmudic Trac-
tate Yoma 10a, that speaks about the Romans, the Persians, and the 
Chaldeans, about wars and about political decisions. Both Chaldeans and 
Romans destroyed the Temple of Jerusalem. Levinas focuses both on the 
«builders or destroyers of the Temple»9. However, the symbolic value of 
the temple in Jerusalem remains unaltered. Both in the rituals performed 
in the Temple so long as it was built, and in the remaining ruins of the 
Temple, it always signifies for the whole of humanity. But it signifies it in 
different ways, as we shall see.
According to him, the social and political power of other cultures 
and peoples is judged in reference of their actions regarding the Temple, 
that is, with respect to humanity, which is symbolized in this ethical and 
religious institution of Israel. So, the Temple of Jerusalem is not only a 
national institution, but the symbol of (i.) an ethical demand to all other 
peoples and nations, and (ii.) of the answer of these other people to that 
demand.
From the time of Romans, the Temple does not exist anymore. A 
political power destroyed it after the long history of its early building, 
and its successive devastations and restorations. It seems to be an empty 
place, only ruins, but ruins of the place of revelation of God to Abraham 
and Isaac. Consequently, these ruins are speaking to humankind not only 
about the rituals performed centuries ago in them by the people of Israel, 
[8]  Martin Kavka review of Daniel Breslauer’s Creating a Judaism without Religion, in 
Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies, 22-2/2004, p. 175.
[9]  Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures…, p. 63.
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but about the Ark of the Covenant which was deposited inside it, and of 
the relationship of men with the sacred ethical demand expressed in the 
Ten Commandments, which were the revelation of God to Moses. For that 
reason, these ruins are a good symbol of a relationship of «a humanity of 
the Torah»10 with God that cannot be inserted in a totality with the politi-
cal history. Holy history and universal history does not form any totality.
The relationship between God and humanity is one of the main 
themes of Levinas’ philosophical thinking. A theme which came to him by 
his Jewish tradition. The Temple can be thought as the space where that 
relationship is accomplished. As such, the Temple can be thought as the 
space where transcendence is manifest. This is Heidegger’s approach. For 
him, the temple is related to the presence of the god. 
«This presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a 
holy precinct. The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefi-
nite. It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gath-
ers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and 
death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline 
acquire the shape of destiny for human being».11
For Heidegger, the temple is a symbol, which signifies for the world 
that it unconceals; the world which gathers around it. The temple is the 
symbol of a culture, of a world-view that «gives to things their look and to 
men their outlook on themselves».12 For Heidegger the Temple is firstly 
a work of art. And as such, its main function is to establish a world, the 
unconcealment of a congruent set of meanings of the Being. But Levinas 
speaks neither of the Temple in general, nor of a Greek temple, but of a 
particular, and non-Greek temple: the Temple in Jerusalem. As García 
explains, Levinas disagrees with Heidegger, because «the human being 
as being-in-the-world is not the human being open to any other human 
beings in a passive and receptive way».13 For Levinas, this Temple does not 
speak only about Jewish culture, Jewish institutions or Jewish world, but 
about humanity, the whole of humanity.
And the Temple of Jerusalem signifies for the whole of humani-
ty even in its absence. For Heidegger, the presence of the holy prescient 
[10]  Ibid., p. 52.
[11]  Heidegger, M., «The Origin of the Work of Art» in Poetry, Language, Thought, Translated 
by Albert Hofstadter, Harper & Row, 1971, pp. 40-1.
[12]  Ibid., p. 42.
[13]  García, J. A., Introducción a la filosofía de Levinas, Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico, Serie universi-
taria, nº 140, Pamplona, 2001, p. 32.
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unconceals a whole world. For Levinas, it is the absence of the Temple, 
which is symbolic. Against Heidegger, who speaks about Being, Levinas 
is thinking about nonbeing.14 As Ira F. Stone explains «the destruction of 
the Temple poses a problem: how to provide a hope for redemption in its 
absence; but it is not necessarily an irresoluble problem»,15 because if the 
Jewish tradition sees «the holy as a who, and not as a what»,16 then one 
can say that a Temple in ruins shows better the holiness than the Temple 
perfectly constructe, because for a thing to be in ruins means the vanish-
ing of his character of a what. Moreover, for Levinas, the other is beyond 
any possible presence, and for that reason, it cannot be present. It is be-
yond any subject’s experience, outside consciousness, and for that reason 
it has a negative transcendence. It is the same absence of the Temple, 
which speaks to us.
The Temple is not anymore, a totality, but a place of fragments 
which speaks to us about war, suffering, deportation, invasion, and con-
quest, that is, these ruins speaks to us about the violence inflicted to the 
ethical and religious demand. For that reason, the ruins of the Temple 
of Jerusalem appeal to our responsibility. They are an appeal directed to 
the core of our subjectivity, which is defined by the fact of having ethical 
duties, moral obligations, with the Other.
3. Political Theology and the problem of Messianism
However, the ruins of the Temple of Jerusalem speak to us about 
the relationship of politics with holy History, too. «This latter does not im-
mediately triumph over universal History, which inexorably unfurls; but 
it does allow it to be judged».17 For that reason the Temple of Jerusalem is 
not a symbol of the messianic peace, but of the primacy of ethical demands 
over political and juridical powers. The ruins of the Temple are a symbol 
of the priority of ethics for all other people of the Earth.
According to Levinas, Yoma 10b is a Talmudic text, in which some 
rabbinical scholars discuss a prophecy about the end of history. It is a 
[14]  Cf.: Kavka, M., Being and nonbeing: The appropriation of the Greek concept of to me on in Jewish 
thought, Rice University, Houston, 2000. 
[15]  Stone, I. F., Reading Levinas/Reading Talmud: An Introduction, The Jewish Publication Soci-
ety, Philadelphia-Jerusalem, 1998, p. 92.
[16]  Patterson, D., «What makes Emmanuel Levinas a Jewish Thinker»…, p, 17.
[17]  Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures…., p. 52.
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prophecy that predicts a war between the Persians and the Romans, that 
is, between two great empires.
«It concerns the possible war which should end History and which would be 
played out —if wars are played out— between these two empires».18
History, for Levinas, is the human time in which one can achieve 
individual or collective goals. These goals are understood as the real ends 
of History, and for that reason history has a meaning. But to develop these 
goals and to conclude history, it is needed the work of politicians. History 
consequently is the time for politics, for ambitions, for the construction 
of a social order, and for a permanent establishment for the final aim of 
history. The flow of time in history is directed towards future, towards an 
end, a goal. 
This vision of history is a Kantian or Hegelian one: history has 
an end, and a moral end. It is a development, for instance, of freedom or 
self-consciousness, or the construction of a reign of ends. And it means it 
cannot be only violence, but persuasion, science, bureaucracy, etc., too. 
Politics is the place of rivalry, not necessarily war. But politics always 
suggest an idea of a struggle towards ends, an idea «on the meaning of 
political life which, admittedly, is not always war, and which can become 
rivalry, competition and even pure emulation, during periods of peaceful 
coexistence between powers».19 A clash of civilizations, or a war, means 
always at least two different and incompatible goals. In any case, politics 
means always the reduction of the other to the same, to the universal for 
which the politician is fighting. Consequently, politics is an egology, an act 
of reduction of the other to the totality of the same.
However, developing the principle of history towards its conclu-
sion, to establish the reign of ends, or to extend freedom to all humanity, is 
for Levinas tantamount to «the false Messianisms of modern times (times, 
however, which are defined as times of conclusions».20 Politicians and phi-
losophers of history, which proclaim an end and a meaning to history, 
[18]  Ibid., p. 54.
[19]  Ibidem.
[20]  Ibid., p. 17. These «false Messianisms of modern times» has been the object of research 
of Terence Holden in Levinas, Messianism and Parody, Continuum, London and New York, 2011. 
I think that Holden does not bear in mind that Levinas speaks of «false Messianism». This 
adjective implies that for Levinas there is a true and a false Messianism. Perhaps modern 
philosophical history and political theology can only be considered as parodies of Messianism. 
But as parodies they distort the truth of Messianism. As Martin Kavka has shown one can 
find in Levinas a «demythologizing the concept of the Messiah». Kavka, Martin, Jewish Messian-
ism and the History of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, p. 197.
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are then false Messiahs, because to point a goal in a possible future that 
gives meaning to all the rest of the time «relativizes and devalues every 
moment […] foreseeing a supra-temporal eternity of ideal».21 We can find 
some examples of false Messianism in the leibnizian theory of indefinite 
progress, the development of history in Hegel, the historical progression 
of Marxism to the communist State, or the Law of three stages formu-
lated by Comte. All false Messianisms have in common the certainty in 
a future and secular completion and salvation of humanity. Salvation of 
exploitation, of slavery, of suffering. False Messianism then, anticipates 
an optimist future for the whole of humanity. One can remember here that 
Comte venerated humanity and called it «le grand être», the great being. 
False Messianism are secular prophecies. According to Levinas, history 
contrasts with true Messianism and eschatology. True Messianism has 
nothing to do with fighting for a goal, with historicism, or with a devalua-
tion of the present or past time. Eschatology has nothing to do with goals, 
achievements or history.
There is a large tradition of Jewish philosophers offering differ-
ent interpretations of Messianism: Maimonides, Hermann Cohen, Franz 
Rosenzweig, Emile Fackenheim, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derri-
da. Most of them have confronted with the historicism of the nineteenth 
century, and for that reason with the false Messianism of Political Philos-
ophy and Theology.22 However, P. Gordon23  or Martin Kavka, among oth-
ers, have shown that Levinas must be detached from these philosophers.
To bring Messianism up into the question of the symbolic value of 
the Temple is very important to Jewish eschatology, because the construc-
tion of the Third Temple (Beit haMikdash haShlishi) and the restoration 
of the sacrificial worship (Korban) will occur in the era of the Messiah. So, 
the meaning of the messianic time, the wish of undertaking the rebuild-
ing of It, and to hope the resumption of the sacrificial cult, are matters of 
great significance for Judaism. An importance which is expressed in the 
prayer of the Amidah, on the core of the daily Jewish liturgy. But in this 
approach, Messianism and Temple are linked together to a particular reli-
gion and does not signify for the whole of humanity.
In Difficult Freedom, Levinas explains what he understands un-
der «Messianism». Messianism is not related to history, or to the telos of 
[21]  Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures…., p. 54.
[22]  Cf. David Myers’s Resisting History. Historicism and Its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought, 
Princenton University Press, Princenton, 2010.
[23]  Gordon, P. Rosenzweig and Heidegger. Between Judaism and German Philosophy, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2003.
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history. If it were so, then the «Messiah» should not differentiate himself 
from a politician. A politician works for a better world in the future, and 
this entails a predictable future. Politicians must anticipate a totality in 
the future and work for it. But one of the key features of the Messiah is 
the unpredictability of his arrival. One cannot anticipate the messianic 
times. The Messiah lives in the time of the surprise. And to live in hope of 
the Messiah means to live hoping for the surprise, or the disturbance, of 
the Other. The temporality of true Messianism cannot be fully constituted 
by a subject thinking and projecting his actions from the first person, not 
by an impersonal process either. Against the foreseen totality, the other 
is infinite because it transcends any thought of the self. The appeal of the 
other cannot be anticipated, neither in its form nor its content. The subject 
cannot anticipate what the other can demand from oneself, nor the way in 
which he shall be appealed.
The first person does not have the priority. One must be open for 
the appeal of the other, a second person with which one encounters. With-
out intersubjective experiences the ethical demand is a mere empty for-
malism. And for that reason, the subject must empty out itself in order to 
be for the appeal, for the other. As Irina Poleshchuhk explains, «Messianic 
temporality comes as a disturbance of the present time of subjectivity —as 
inverted and displaced sensibility— deprived of making choices or carry-
ing out moral actions, but at the same time gaining its future freedom by 
giving a gift of time in promising and asking for forgiveness. One of the 
advantages of this view is its ability to see the temporality of futurity as 
correcting itself in chains of intersubjective experiences and not as an iso-
lated act of fulfilling expectation».24 Politics have, as an essential feature 
of its temporality, the anticipation, the foresight. In a political action one 
must foresee what is going to happen. And false messianisms are always 
pointing to a victory in a future. But one cannot foresee the appeal of the 
other. Moreover, one cannot ever predict the consequences of the own ac-
tions. For that reason, one must always be in disposition to ask for for-
giveness, and to act in the interest of the other. The appeal of the other is 
always caused by his suffering. And for that reason, true Messianism has 
to do with my responsibility with any suffering of the other. Consequently, 
a destroyed temple, a temple, which has suffered violence against it and 
against the people, which congregates around it, can be a good symbol of 
our universal responsibility with any form of suffering.
[24]  Poleshchuk, I., «The Ethics of Futurity: Messianism and Intersubjectivity» in Interna-
tional Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 4, No. 5(1); March 2014, p. 66.
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«Messianism is therefore not the certainty of the coming of a man who stops 
History. It is my power to bear the suffering of all. It is the moment when I 
recognize this power and my universal responsibility».25
It is not casual that Levinas worked from 1930 in the Alliance is-
raélite universelle. Although the motto of this organization is that «All Jews 
bear responsibility for one another», Levinas, as we shall see, following Dos-
toievski, broads this thesis to all humanity: «All human beings bear re-
sponsibility for one another». My responsibility is an infinite one because 
my wish cannot be reduced. The human wish and longing for infinite, is 
reduced by any form of false Messianism, by any anticipated totality.26
One can hear the echoes of this text in many others of Levinas. 
Messianism is confronted with politics through the question of suffering. 
Often politics is entrusted to «eradicating evil through war».27 A legitimate 
mission of politics, it is said, maybe to punish other peoples and nations, 
because the state is the «only human Gemeinschaft which lays claim to the 
monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force».28 For that reason, only 
politics through the State — Gewaltmonopol des Staates— can have as a 
task to combat against evil and suffering. But then we find here a clash of 
attitudes in front of suffering. The attitude of politics and the attitude of 
Messianism.
Politics has as an essential possibility the legitimation of inflicting 
suffering as a mean to achieve justice. As a result, a politically just act can 
entail a great dose of violence. And for this reason, it is needed Messianism 
and eschatology. Levinas finds this idea in the comment of Rabbi Johanan 
bar Nappaha to Jeremiah 30:6-7:
«That is not, then, what R. Johanan fears. Instead, he anguishes over a verse from Jere-
miah:
Ask ye now, and see whether a man doth travail with child? Wherefore do I see every 
man with his hands on his loins, as a woman in travail, and all faces are turned into 
paleness? Alas! that day is so great there is none like it (Jeremiah 30:6-7).
This is the verse that frightens R. Johanan, for he naturally reads it in his own way. ‘Every 
man’ [geber] is not the totality of man; every man designates Him who is virility itself 
[geburah]. ‘Every’ is here the adverb ‘all’. He who is every man is all man, all humanity, 
[25]  Levinas, E., Difficult Freedom, John Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1990, pp. 89-90.
[26]  Cfr.: García, J. A., Introducción a la filosofía de Levinas, Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico, Serie uni-
versitaria, nº 140, Pamplona, 2001, p. 27.
[27]  Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures…, p. 64.
[28]  Weber, M., «Politicis as a vocation» in Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society, translated 
and edited by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters. Palgrave Books 2015, p. 136.
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all virility. At the end of time God holds His hands on His loins, as though in labour. 
Why does He hold His hands on His loins? Because at the messianic moment He must 
sacrifice the wicked to the good. Because in the just act there is still a violence that caus-
es suffering. Even when the act is reasonable, when the act is just, it entails violence».29
If politics legitimates the use of violence and to inflict suffering, 
Messianism, on the other hand, means the own power and the own re-
sponsibility to bear the suffering of all humankind, and not only for the 
sufferings of the people of my own present, but also for all the sufferings 
that the world has ever seen. This seems to be a Christian and not Jewish 
interpretation of Messianism. As Moyn has shown Levinas has a great 
debt with Christians scholars, both philosophers like Kierkegaard, writers 
like Dostoievski and theologians like Barth and Wahl.30
4. Messianism and sacrifice: Levinas on substitution
Messianism is an attitude of individuals, and not a political legit-
imation. True messianism does not fight, but it is the attitude to bear 
the suffering of the other, and to feel my responsibility for any suffering 
of any human being. This goes beyond any possible calculation of my re-
sponsibility, or of any personal responsibility. There are no limits for my 
accountability. It is obvious that to feel a responsibility for any suffering 
entails sacrifice as a mode of existence. And sacrifice is what, according to 
Levinas, makes place for the other:
«the passage of the identical to the other in substitution, which makes possible sacri-
fice».31
I have an unlimited accountability, and as such, an unlimited suf-
fering to shoulder. This seems to be an excessive responsibility. An excess 
—démesure— of it that can only lead to sacrifice. In chapter V of Other-
wise than Being Levinas cites Zosima in Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karama-
zov: «each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I more than 
the others». It seems a huge, radical, and terrible situation that concerns 
everybody —not only Zosima—, independently of the guilt that appears 
to his personal consciousness. For that reason, this demand has nothing 
[29]  Levinas, E., Difficult Freedom, John Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1990, p. 79.
[30]  Cf. Moyn, S., Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics, Cornell 
University Press, 2005. 
[31]  Levinas, E., «Substitution», in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, Indiana Uni-
versity Press, Bloomington, 1996, p. 90. 
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to do —apparently— with justice. Moreover, if justice has anything to do 
with reciprocity, Messianism expresses a relationship of non-reciprocity 
between my responsibility and that of the other. And that means asymme-
try in human relationships.32 This is the interpretation of Alain Toumayan 
of Levinas’ reception of Dostoyevsky.
However it is possible to offer another reading of the texts. Perhaps 
there is no asymmetry because all of us have a common guilt, which we 
must admit. The acknowledgement of it seems to be the confession that 
«each of us is guilty before everyone», regardless of which crimes every-
one has committed, that is: «for everyone». Perhaps every human being is 
united with the rest of humanity by ties of guilt, or perhaps Zosima is dis-
covering fraternity. Fraternity entails loving links with any other human 
being, connections which allows us to be ready to sacrifice for the sake of 
the other, to substitute the guilt of the other.
Cora Diamond gives us a good example of what means fraternity. 
It is a very fitting example to clarify this mystery of the unlimited guilt.
«The sense of mystery surrounding our lives, the feeling of solidarity in mysterious ori-
gin and uncertain fate: this binds us to each other, and the binding meant includes the 
dead and the unborn, and those who bear on their faces ‘a look of blank idiocy,’ those 
who lack all power of speech, those behind whose vacant eyes their lurks a ‘soul in mute 
eclipse’».33
There is a deep contrast between Zosima’s and Ivan Karamazov’s 
visions of justice. For Ivan, justice means lawfulness; and in absence of 
God, «all is lawful». For Ivan, if there is no God, there is no guilt, only in-
fringement of laws. What a crime is, depends only of the social recognition 
by law or rules. As Alain Toumayan has argued, Zosima’s thesis of my 
unlimited responsibility, and the infinity of his wish is the counterpoint of 
Ivan unconstrained arbitrariness.
For Ivan, a right behavior is a recognized and permitted one, as if I 
would have signed a social contract. This contract is based upon the prem-
ise that I exist solely for myself, that I can only accept a loss of freedom 
for the sake of a profit, like security, etcetera. In consequence, one must 
respond only to his own actions, and of the suffering he causes. I must pay 
[32]  Cf.: Toumayan, A., «”I more than the others”: Dostoevsky and Levinas» in Yale French 
Studies, 104 (2004): Encounters with Levinas, p. 55: «the notion of asymmetry or nonreciprocity 
that it expresses so radically and so strikingly (and that Levinas employs to distinguish his 
thought from Martin Buber’s I/Thou)» 
[33]  Diamond, C., «The Importance of Being Human» in Cockburn, D., (ed.), Human Beings, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 55.
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for my own actions, not for the others. This is for Levinas tantamount to 
egoism. This is an egotistical calculation of my accountability. However, 
this egotistical act splits the society, and breaks the human fraternity.
It is true that I can fight for a better world, but that depends upon 
my personal decision, and just in case my responsibility is not an unlim-
ited one. Freedom for Ivan Karamazov means autonomy, self-reference. 
Levinas calls this vision of freedom «egotistical». As autonomous being 
each one must answer exclusively of his autonomous decisions. I can suffer 
for erroneous or unjust decisions of other persons, and I can choose to fight 
them. Ivan’s sense of justice is then a political one. The egotistical respon-
sibility is only a limited one. 
On the contrary, according to Levinas «I approach the infinite by 
sacrificing myself».34  It is not a coincidence that according to the Bible35 
the Temple in Jerusalem was built on Mount Moriah, the place of the 
sacrifice of Isaac. This was the mount of Abraham and Isaac’s analēmpsis 
(ἀνάλημψις), of their ascension to the highest place, to the Infinite. In the 
Psalms one can find the theme of the ascent to Jerusalem, the pilgrimage 
of all Nations to the Most High. Because of the sacrifice of Isaac, Abram 
(which signifies «patriarch») received the name of Ab-raham «father of a 
multitude».36. As Maimonides says, Abraham and Isaac sacrifice causes 
that:
«he (Avraham) is the father of the whole world, who are gathered under the wings of 
the Shechinah».37
This seems to be the symbolic value of the Temple in Jerusalem. 
By means of sacrificing himself, Abraham is the mystical father of the 
whole world. And the temple erected in Moriah remembers humanity that 
sacrifice makes possible the passage from the identical to the other, the 
fulfilment of the human wish of infinity.
I approach the infinite I wish, by means of sacrifice, that is, by my 
unlimited answerability. But one can sacrifice himself for… defending a 
cause, for an ideal, for his parents, for his country, etc. And this form of 
[34]  Levinas, E., «Enigma and phenomenon» in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writ-
ings…, p. 76.
[35]  2 Chronicles 3:1. «Then Solomon began to build the temple of the LORD in Jerusalem on 
Mount Moriah, where the LORD had appeared to his father David. It was on the threshing 
floor of Araunah the Jebusite, the place provided by David.»
[36]  Genesis 17:5.
[37]  Maimonides, Hilchot Bikurim, c. 4. sect. 3.
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sacrifice entails calculation, and with it, plans, and limits. Perhaps not 
any form of suffering calls to my responsibility, and my sacrifice can be 
useless. But for Levinas, a universal responsibility before everyone for 
everyone involves sacrifice without calculation. Sacrifice transcends util-
ity and identity. However, to the extent that I am «guilty before everyone 
for everyone, and I more than the others», this sacrifice seems to be not a 
gratuitous act, because of my guilt. It seems to be a due action.
This seems to be the case of my duties with my fellow men, and not 
with the whole of humanity. My neighbors —from my parents and friends, 
to my compatriot— constitute my subjectivity. I am a subjectivity not only 
because I relate to myself, and because I must become actively myself. It is 
not sameness that makes me a person, because I am not a separate being. 
Consequently, the others and my duty with the others are constitutive of 
my very own being. I am a subjectivity insofar as I respond and answer 
for the other. I am constituted as subject by the face of the other, and not 
by my personal autonomy and independence. However, my relationship 
with the other is an asymmetrical one. He, or she, constitutes me. And for 
Levinas, the asymmetry broads itself to the whole of mankind. One must 
care or nurse any other as his brother. Human fraternity is the ground of 
the unlimited answerability.
«Responsibility does not come from fraternity, it is fraternity that gives responsibility for 
the other its name, prior to my freedom».38
 It is not strange that Dostoievski wrote the sentence of Zosima in 
a book about brothers and fraternity. But how can any other come to my 
responsibility?
«The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we 
here name the face».39
The face is the mode of appearance for the other that allows to 
let him to be in its transcendence. Therefore, the face is not the real face 
of a person which I perceive, but «epiphany and visitation».40 The face is the 
place of the event in which the transcendence of the other visits and ap-
peals to me. Compared with this event, my own consciousness, my person-
al ideas about the other, or my identification with him in terms of fami-
ly, friendship, religion, country etc., are completely irrelevant. The other 
[38]  Levinas, E., Of God Who Comes to Mind, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998, p. 72.
[39]  Levinas, E., Totality and Infinity…, op. Cit., p. 50.
[40]  Cf.: Toumayan, A., «”I more than the others”: Dostoevsky and Levinas»… p. 65.
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transcends my consciousness, my ideas, my interiority, my ideals, and me. 
Due to its transcendence, the other must not appear to me in anyway, and 
for this reason, he and me, does not constitute ever a «we». It is not a He-
gelian problem of recognition, of identities. I must treat the other always 
as a guest —without asking his name, without identifying him as…—, I 
must take care for him. And this taking care is a moral command: Do not 
kill me! «The ethical responsibility for the other precedes knowledge of the 
other».41 This entails that responsibility is prior to freedom. And that is Zo-
sima’s perspective, which involves that our duties are prior to our freedom. 
For that reason, Zosima’s vision of justice is a messianic one.
But why has the other such a power upon myself? Why has it 
termed Levinas to this vision of justice of «Messianism»? What has all of 
this got to do with the symbolism of the Temple of Jerusalem?
5. Fraternity and the rituals performed in the Temple in Je-
rusalem
If Messianism is radically different from politics, then Messian-
ism cannot belong to history, it belongs to another form of temporality, 
and it belongs to Holy history. And the essence of the Holy History is the 
«always». By contrast, one can characterize the temporality of the histor-
icism or the political activity as the «never». If time must continue it is 
for the only reason that the goal and end of history has, until now, never 
been achieved. I do not want to say that freedom has never been achieved. 
Of course, it has! «But “never” does not contrast with “sometime” but to 
“always”».42 That is so, because the goal of history must be a universal sit-
uation or condition for the whole of humanity. According to Hegel, history 
needs to spread freedom all over the world. According to Kant, history 
needs a universal kingdom of ends. «Never» is then, a general notion, and 
a modal notion, because it has to do with the possibility of history. History 
is only possible, according to every type of historicism, because its end has 
never been achieved. This absolute negativity of the end is the motor of 
time. 
But perhaps there are other ways of living in time. Time can be a 
time of development. But the time of Israel, according to Levinas, the Mes-
sianism, is to be subjected to an «always». And that means a time in which 
any moment could be devaluated. Every moment can have an absolute 
[41]  Williams, R., Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other, State University of New York 
Press, New York, 1992, p. 298.
[42]  Polo, L., Hegel y el posthegelianismo, Eunsa, Pamplona, p. ¿?
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meaning, and not a relative one. If the time of development is the time of 
a totality, which spreads itself through every moment, then to attach to 
a time where there is always a possibility of absoluteness, is to affirm a 
temporal sequence incapable of constituting a totality. Every moment has 
an infinite value. No moment is relative to another that confers its mean-
ing. But a moment with infinite value is a moment of holiness, a sacred, 
blessed and pure moment. 
«Does not Israel attach itself to an ‘always’ —in other words, to a permanence in time, to 
a time held by moments of holiness, by the way in which they have a meaning or are ‘so 
close to the goal’— and where not one of these moments is lost, or to be lost, but they are 
all to be deepened, that is to say, sublimated? And instead of remaining word, a purely 
theoretical view or doctrinal affirmation, or some sort of coexistence of moments of 
time passing, do not this predilection and this signification of the always call for a whole 
structuring of concrete human reality and a whole orientation of social and intellectual 
life - perhaps justice itself - which would render only such a signification possible and 
significant? ».43
Levinas «believes that revelation is an event that places each of us 
in a certain position, posture or attitude prior to anything that we do or 
any act we perform».44 But according to Levinas, revelation occurs in the 
face-to-face relationship, not in symbols. It is the face of any other person 
that calls me to be concerned for him. One can see in the face of the other 
the divine command to accept him, to accept his humanity, and to respond 
to him. Then, we can ask ourselves if there can be a revelation in stones, 
instead of the human face? Does not that mean a contradiction in a central 
theme of Levinas’ philosophy?
As a ruin, the Temple of Jerusalem is not only a fragment of a 
magnificent political past of the Jewish People. As a dead thing, as a ruin, 
it speaks about the eschatology. And it speaks, to humankind, but making 
each human being free from the concern of a time to come, and absolving 
him from the worry about future and history, which founds politics.
«The eschatological, as the ‘beyond’ of history, draws beings out of the jurisdic-
tion of history and the future; it arouses them in and calls them forth to their 
full responsibility. It restores to each instant its full signification in that very instant».45
[43]  Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse…, op. cit., p. 17.
[44]  Morgan, M., Discovering Levinas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge MA, 2007, p. 
214.
[45]  Levinas, E., Totality and Infinity, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1969, p. 23.
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Levinas speaks about the meaning of the eschatological as always, 
and not as something beyond time, when he comments another Talmudic 
text. This is the Tractate Menahoth 99b-100a, which speaks of the Mish-
ná, one of the most sacred rituals performed at the Temple in Jerusalem. 
The Mishná is the ceremony in which the priests every Sabbath leaves 
bread on a golden table before the Lord, and eats the bread, which they 
put on the table seven days before. Levinas emphasizes the permanence 
of the ritual:
«The position of the bread on the table, continually before the Lord – ‘before me [con-
tinually]’, says the text. It is the meaning of permanence».46
To emphasize permanence means to underscore eternalness, per-
petuity. The ritual is a perpetual duty. Not only a duty performed only on 
Sabbath, because there was fresh bread always, permanently there, on the 
tables. And that speaks about a permanent present, about every instant, 
not about future. Levinas ask himself:
«What does permanence signify? What does the ‘always’ signify? How can the always 
have signification? How does Israel think the significance of the always?»47
The Bread on the table has the name of Shewbread: the bread that 
shows, the bread of faces48. According to Levinas, politics in Israel has 
a different meaning from that of western’s historicism. Political activity, 
and the ideal of a politician in Israel, has a perfect symbol in the figure of 
Joseph in the book of Genesis. «Kingship in Israel is always Joseph feed-
ing the people».49 The king must nurture his people. A king is the one who 
argues against Cain’s statement: «Yes, you are the nurse of your fellow 
men». And this feeding of the hungry is performed and symbolized at the 
core of the Temple of Jerusalem. The kingship of somebody relates to the 
sacred action of compassion, an action before the face of the other. And an 
action, which must always be performed at the core of the Temple. The 
priests enter in the Sancta Sanctorum looking in every moment at their 
faces, puts the new bread on a gold table, and comes from this room with 
the bread of the last Sabbath looking mutually to the faces, and eating 
them after depositing it on another gold table. These priests perform the 
ritual of the always, the ritual of the Mishná, by which «the permanence 
[46]  Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse…, op. Cit., p. 16.
[47]  Ibid., p. 17.
[48]  Ibid., p. 18.
[49]  Ibidem.
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of the human is ensured by the solidarity constituted around a communal 
work».50
The Temple of Jerusalem symbolizes then, the «always». It sym-
bolizes that the moment of absolute value, are all the moments during 
which we feed and take care of the others. For that reason, the symbol of 
the Temple of Jerusalem is, at the same time, a symbol of the most sacred, 
because it «is an exact replica of the heavenly Temple, the order of abso-
lute holiness».51 So, we have that the Temple in Jerusalem represents in 
Earth the Heavenly Temple. It is exactly an imago Templi, and an imago 
of eternity, and of justice. 
But if the Temple was destroyed, and only its ruins remain for-
ever, the rituals performed by the People of Israel constitute the face to 
face relationship that can always save the world and judge it. Perhaps the 
most known of these rituals is the twice a day pray of the Shema Ysra’el. 
«According to the rabbinical tradition, this prayer expresses the acceptance of the 
‘celestial yoke’, the submission to the Law. Submission to the Law, perma-
nence of service».52 Service must be performed always. And for that rea-
son, before everyone. Each son of Abraham must care for «before everyone 
and for everyone». We have just remembered this sentence of the staret 
Zosima, his testament, that must be accepted always (twice a day) by the 
Jewish People, it is an acceptance of the «celestial yoke» for everyone before 
everyone.
[50]  Ibid., p. 23.
[51]  Levinas, E., Beyond the Verse…, op. Cit., p. 158.
[52]  Ibid., p. 25.
